The popular business press usually views foreign acquisitions by emerging economy firms very positively. The stock markets have often reacted negatively to the acquisitions. The management always claims that the acquisition is in the long term strategic interests of the firm. This article attempts to shed light on these conflicting positions: short term versus long term, and financial versus strategic logic. I describe below a common story to illustrate the tensions.
On 31 January 2007, Tata Steel increased its offer price to acquire Corus Steel to 608p a share, topping the 603p offer from rival bidder, the Brazilian company CSN, thus clinching the deal. The Managing Director of Tata Steel, B. Muthuraman, cast his firm's victory in broad light as a milestone for Indian business and the country's economy. This upbeat mood was echoed by India's finance minister, Palaniappan Chidambaram, who said the successful bid reflected the new-found confidence of Indian industry. 2 The shareholders of Tata Steel were not nearly so enthused, and penalized the stock by 11% the next day. Ratan Tata, the chairman of the Tata group, responded "Quite frankly I do feel [the stock market] is taking a short-term and harsh view. In the future somebody will look back and say we did the right thing." Analysts argued that Tata was overpaying for the acquisition, citing, for example, that the price was 9 times Corus's (EBITDA)
earnings that dwarfed the 6 times that Mittal Steel recently paid to acquire Arcelor. Mr.
Muthuraman accepted that the deal "may look expensive" but was in fact in the strategic interests of both companies allowing Tata Steel access to Corus's markets and Corus the access to cheap raw materials and low costs of steel making.
I first briefly review the previous research on acquisitions. My research sample consists of all large foreign acquisitions by Indian companies during the years 2000-09. I consider the stock market performance of these 17 acquisitions during a one-year time window. I supplement this small sample study by examining in-depth the three largest acquisitions using a case study approach, and conclude that the foreign acquisitions from India have not created shareholder value. The causes of this under-performance are: too little integration, agency problems, and easy capital. Finally, I use a case study to illustrate a successful approach to foreign acquisitions: significant synergies, reasonable price, and deep integration.
Previous research
There has been a tremendous amount of research on acquisitions, especially in the fields of finance, strategy and international business. I review very briefly the previous research at three levels: acquisitions in general, cross-border acquisitions, and crossborder acquisitions from emerging economies.
Acquisitions create value due to synergy between the acquiring and target firms.
Synergy is derived from operational gains, market power, or some form of financial gain.
Assuming efficient capital markets and limited potential for increasing market power, the emphasis has been on operational gains due to economies of scale or scope as the source of synergy. In the resource based view of the firm, company growth is a quest for productive opportunities to profitably use firm-specific assets, such as technological, marketing and distribution capabilities. Growth is the best way to use these specialized resources because market frictions prevent the firm from trading its stock of valuable resources. 3 This synergy gain is then divided between the acquiring and target firms.
The more efficient is the market for corporate control, the larger is the share of gains captured by the target firm. Much empirical research confirms that acquisitions do create value. 4 However, acquiring firms on the average do not gain value; somewhere between half to three-fourths of acquiring firms actually lose shareholder value. 5 Given this well accepted result, other explanations are needed for why so many acquisitions take place.
There might be an agency problem: managers do acquisitions to maximize their own utility at the expense of the shareholders. Another possibility is that hubristic managers overestimate their competence with respect to identifying and exploiting synergies. 6 This would explain why so many acquiring firms do not create shareholder value.
There is also much literature that examines cross-border acquisitions. The argument for synergies is stronger than in the case of domestic acquisitions because of greater market frictions. Firms extract above-normal profits from foreign direct investment by internalizing host-country market imperfections when their firm-specific resources cannot be easily traded across country boundaries. This view is embedded in the exploitation perspective, whereby firms make use of their specialized resources by expanding into foreign markets. But there are also increased challenges with post-acquisition integration due to cultural and institutional barriers. The empirical evidence is inconclusive about acquiring firms creating shareholder value through foreign acquisitions. 7 A survey-based study conducted by the consulting firm KPMG concluded that 83% of 700 cross-border deals in the period 1996-1998 had not delivered shareholder value. But, interestingly, in the same survey, 82% of the respondents believed that the deal they had been involved in had been a success. 8 In contrast to the exploitation perspective described above, international acquisitions by emerging economy firms might be motivated by the potential to acquire specialized strategic resources. There are inherent problems in transacting intangible resources and capabilities through market mechanisms. Foreign acquisitions might be the best way for emerging economy firms to gain these strategic capabilities quickly. This 'reverse' flow of specialized resources and capabilities from the target to the emerging economy acquirer is often mentioned in both the academic literature and the popular press as the major benefit of such acquisitions. The driving logic for these acquisitions is to exploit and/or acquire specialized firm-specific resources that result in competitive advantage and above normal profitability.
There is much less empirical research on international acquisitions by emerging economy 
Research Design
Event study methodology focuses on the stock market reaction to a particular event in a short time window, from a few (typically 1 to 10) days before the announcement of the event to a few days after the announcement. The firm's stock market change is adjusted for changes in the overall stock market and the firm's systematic risk using a common linear market model. This methodology has become the standard way to measure value creation in the acquisition studies, at least partly because it has desirable statistical properties. This methodology assumes that the stock market response to the acquisition announcement is instantaneous, complete and unbiased, based on the semi-strong form of the efficient market hypothesis. There are several problems with this methodology in the context of large foreign acquisitions by emerging economy firms. First, it is debatable how efficient the stock markets are in emerging economies. Second, and more importantly, the focal events --cross-border acquisitions by emerging economy firms --are complex, infrequent, and novel strategic initiatives. It is likely that the stock market collectively does not fully understand these events and is prone to heuristic biases. Third, the stock market reacts immediately to an acquisition announcement based on its past experience with similar deals and its incomplete understanding of the current deal; the event study methodology measures only this immediate reaction. Over time more information about the prospective deal, and eventually information about post-acquisition performance is revealed. The stock market then reaches a new equilibrium that reflects the value created (or destroyed) by the acquisition. This period of resolution of uncertainty, from the announcement to the new equilibrium, can range from a few months to a few years. 12 It is thus useful to supplement event study methodology with other research using long-term performance measures.
The problem with long-term performance measures is that other confounding events occur and it is difficult to isolate the impact of the focal acquisition. I will resolve this dilemma by measuring stock market performance from the day before the announcement to one year after the announcement. Since I study large foreign acquisitions, it is unlikely that the acquiring firm has faced another similarly dramatic event in one year. For all firms in my sample the acquisition is completed within this one-year time window, and the stock market has seen some indications of post-acquisition performance.
The performance measure I will use is simply the 'relative stock market returns' defined as the shareholder returns of the acquiring firm minus the returns to a broad index of the stock market, during the time window one day before the announcement of the acquisition to one year after the announcement. For stocks with firm systematic risk (measured by 'beta') close to one, this is an acceptable way to measure performance. This simple measure has the advantage of minimal manipulation of the data, and requires no assumptions about stock market behavior, and is probably close to how many investors assess the firm's performance. As a check, I also calculate 'buy and hold abnormal returns' for the same time window using the capital asset pricing model and find no difference in results. For these three case studies, I can also examine other significant events faced by the firms that might have a confounding effect on shareholder returns. Table 3 . The number of foreign acquisitions exhibiting positive and negative performance is about equal. These results are inconclusive, and consistent with previous academic research.
Empirical Results
There is no evidence to support the view that large foreign acquisitions by Indian firms have created shareholder value.
Insert Table 3 about here While I focus on the one-year time window, Table 4 provides the comparison of the short-term (day before the announcement to 5 days after the announcement) stock market reaction and the long-term reaction to the acquisitions, using the relative returns measure.
It is interesting to note that the correlation coefficient between the returns for the two windows is only 0.21. This provides support for supplementing previous research using the event study methodology with other research (such as this article) using long-term performance measures.
Insert Table 4 about here had incurred to acquire Jaguar Land Rover.
As a general proposition, target firms prefer stock swaps and receive equity when they are confident that the assets that will be acquired will create value for the buying firm. It is not a positive signal that all the Indian foreign acquisitions were done for cash. One reason for the cash transactions could be that many Indian firms are owned or controlled by promoter shareholders, who also comprise the management. Foreign sellers are often hesitant to invest through stock swaps in firms they perceive may not always be run 'professionally,' according to some private fund insiders.
14 Another explanation for the cash transactions could be that the Indian promoters are wary of stock swaps because they might not wish to dilute their equity share in the company.
In general acquiring firms prefer cash transactions if they believe their stocks are undervalued. With the benefit of hindsight, it is difficult to argue that the stocks of the Indian acquiring firms were systematically undervalued during the two and half years leading up to the financial crisis. It is, however, true that the Indian stock market has recovered dramatically since March 2009.
It is also notable that all the acquisitions in my sample were friendly deals. This by itself does not imply that the Indian acquirers overpaid for the acquisitions. It is, however, true that a generous price will tend to make the deal friendlier. Another reason for friendly deals is that the Indian acquirers have a strong preference to retain the current management of the target firms. Corus also brought high R&D capability. He also forecast up to $350 million in savings after about three years from synergies in procuring materials, in marketing and in shared services. Steel prices would rise driven by demand from explosive growth in the biggest markets in the developing world: India and China. Finally, he also believed there was a tremendous amount of cultural fit between Tata Steel and Corus. For the deal to work, Tata had to improve the efficiency of Corus, whose profit margins at 7% were a quarter of those of Tata Steel. Ratan Tata stated "I think our plan would be to try to make the UK operations more profitable." 17 Maybe the strategic logic of the acquisition was right after all, and it had taken the stock market about 15 months to fully appreciate the complexities and subtleties involved in the acquisition. Or, more likely the strategic logic of the acquisition was flawed, and some other confounding event explains the rise in the stock price.
Tata Steel's cost of production at around $450/ton is among the lowest in the world. 
Hindalco and Novelis
Hindalco is the flagship company belonging to the Birla group, one of the largest and most diversified family business houses in India. Hindalco, an industry leader in aluminum and copper, is one of the biggest producers of primary aluminum in Asia. In January, the day before speculation of possible Hindalco bid surfaced. 20 On the day of the announcement, Hindalco shares fell 13.7%; by the end of the next day, the Hindalco shared had underperformed the Sensex by nearly 15% in two days. Kumar Mangalam Birla, Hindalco's Chairman, asked his shareholders to remain "patient" and wrote in the annual report "However, if you look at the bigger picture, this is one of the most striking acquisitions and over the long-term will undeniably create enormous shareholder value."
One year after the announcement, the stock of Hindalco had underperformed the Sensex by 26%.
Hindalco forward integrated from smelting into rolling products by acquiring Novelis.
Debu Bhattacharya, Hindalco's managing director, explained the strategy as follows:
profitability in the upstream business is higher but more volatile because prices are set on the London Metals Exchange (LME); the profitability of the downstream business is lower but also less volatile. Hindalco acquired Novelis to "optimally balance" between upstream and downstream operations as a natural hedge against volatility in the commodity prices of aluminum on the LME. This is weak strategic logic, and the aluminum industry structure is changing in exactly the opposite direction towards deintegration.
The aluminum industry can be divided into two value chain stages. The upstream segment includes bauxite mining, alumina refining, and primary aluminum production.
The downstream segment produces finished aluminum products and includes rolling mills, extrusion and casting. This is a natural 'breaking point' in the industry since aluminum ingot is a commodity and transactions between the upstream and downstream segments can easily be done through markets. There is thus little reason to vertically integrate across these two stages in the aluminum industry. 21 The fully integrated aluminum company has become increasingly less common. Because of these change the integrated business model was "no longer the highest value alternative," according to Alcan top management. 24 Brian Sturgell, the first CEO of
Novelis after the spin-off from Alcan, said that "from that point on, it was a question of when and how Alcan would optimize these upstream and downstream models." 25 However, Tata Motors' officials expressed confidence in the deal's long-term potential.
Managing Director Ravi Kant said the company was "pretty confident that Jaguar and Land Rover will add positively to our consolidated balance sheet." "People are free to make their own opinions, but I think time will prove who is right," Kant said. 26 Instead, the stock performance of Tata Motors worsened over the next year, and its shares 
Analysis
Based on the empirical evidence presented above, both stock market performance and the case studies, I come to the conclusion that large foreign acquisitions by Indian firms have not created shareholder value for the acquiring firms, and have probably destroyed shareholder value. The Economist comes to a similar conclusion that "several of corporate India's acquisitions now seem ill-advised." 30 The causes of this negative outcome are too little integration to achieve synergies, agency problems, and inadequate discipline due to easy capital.
Integration Light
A strong economic or strategic rationale for synergies is the starting point for any successful acquisition. Virtually no acquiring company would dispute this statement.
But, many of the unsuccessful acquisitions involve weak logic dressed up with vacuous statements, such as 'global footprint,' 'scale,' and 'optimal balance.' The Tata Motors-JLR acquisition does not even try to make a strong case based on synergies. Hindalco attempts to justify the Novelis acquisition to achieve some vague balance to reduce risk.
But, there is no need for an acquisition to achieve an objective that the shareholders can easily achieve on their own, such as diversify to reduce non-systematic risk. A succinct but powerful way to state the logic of synergy is that an acquisition can create value when the company can exploit a (usually intangible) firm-specific resource that cannot be easily traded in a marketplace. 33 I think that such a 'light' approach to integration does not, and will not lead to value creation.
Foreign acquisitions by emerging economy firms often seek firm-specific intangible capabilities in areas such as technology, innovation, marketing and distribution. These capabilities cannot just be bolted on to an existing organization. Exploiting a firmspecific resource through an acquisition involves applying or transferring or replicating the resource from one firm to another. This must involve integrating the new resources into the existing organization, which in turn must involve significant organizational integration. Specialized capabilities are woven into the fabric of the organization --that is what makes them 'firm-specific'. If that were not the case, then there would be a reasonably efficient market for that resource, and no need for the acquisition in the first place.
But that does not imply going to the other extreme. Chatterjee equates the Western approach to "conquering" the acquisition; such a heavy-handed approach is likely to fail, of course. But this is a false 'straw man' argument. Kumar too falls into the same trap when he states that in the "traditional approach" to acquisitions "the buyer has clear shortterm aims, but may not have thought through long-term goals." The challenge is to find the appropriate degree of assimilation that preserves the strengths of the two companies but still achieves the synergies available trough the acquisition. Too little integration will lead to no synergies; too much integration might destroy the specialized capabilities of the companies. The devil is in the details, as usual; put differently, good execution is critical.
The three firms studied here do not achieve this balance, and their approach to integration is too light to achieve synergies. Sharing finance and HR, as Chatterjee describes the Tata Steel-Corus company, is surely too little. This is why shared corporate services is not enough to justify conglomerate diversification. Tata Steel and Corus are in the same business, and there is much greater potential for achieving cost reduction through economies of scale --but that would require significant organizational integration. That has been the approach clearly followed successfully by Mittal Steel over decades of international acquisitions in the steel industry. 34 Kumar points out that "Hindalco believed that Novelis's steady earnings would help offset the fluctuations in its profits from year to year." It is true that achieving this benefit would not require any integration. But, it is also not value creating in the first place. Shareholders can easily achieve such reduction in volatility by diversifying their portfolio, and Hindalco did not need to do the acquisition for this reason. 
Agency Problems
The traditional view of the agency problem is that the self-interests of the managers (the agents) diverge from those of the shareholders (the principals). One solution is to align their interests by compensating the managers with stock in the company; thus the managers will have 'skin in the game'. This solution does not work in the context of Indian firms. Many Indian firms are managed and controlled by 'promoter shareholders'.
These promoter-managers already have much financial skin in the game. The problem is that these promoter-managers are very rich, far richer than the other shareholders, and their financial perspective might be very different. The promoter-managers might be more motivated by non-financial factors, such as fame and public adulation, serving a national goal, leaving behind a legacy, and the pride of managing a large multinational company.
Foreign acquisitions by Indian firms have prompted much nationalistic chest-thumping about 'rising India' by the media, and the corporate and political elite. Indian newspapers discussed the Tata-Corus deal under shrill headlines, such as "India poised for global supremacy", "The Empire strikes back," and "Global Indian takeover." Confederation of Indian Industry president R. Seshasayee said "Tata Steel's successful bid for Corus Group Plc. is a statement on Indian Industry's coming of age and takes our Mergers and Acquisition levels to a different paradigm. This is a testimony of the confidence and competence of Indian Industry." Finance Minister Chidambaram said "our industry is capable of raising resources to acquire enterprises abroad and manage them efficiently."
All this popular attention might lead top managers to believe they are primarily responsible for achieving some nationalistic goals, even misconceived goals. In surprisingly candid comments, Ratan Tata revealed about the Corus acquisition: "We all felt that to lose would go beyond the group and it would be an issue of great disappointment in the country. So, on the one hand you want to do the right thing by your shareholders and on the other hand you did not want to lose." 35 Managers, even promoter-shareholder-managers, primarily have a fiduciary responsibility to their shareholders. The Indian media expressed much enthusiasm for an Indian takeover of two U.K. brands, Jaguar and Land Rover, whose roots date back to the days of British colonial rule. But, as Thiyaga Rajan, a fund manager who sold his shares in Tata Motors after the acquisition announcement, put it "patriotic ebullience doesn't rub off on the shares."
The true measure of firm or managerial performance is the economic value created.
However, much of the popular press discussion confuses firm size to be an automatic measure of performance. Completing an acquisition is considered a sign of success.
Winning a bidding war for a target company is seen as 'winning'. But, it is easy to increase firm size while losing money. Similarly, it is easy to 'win' a bidding war by to support basic business operations. 37 Even if one grants this argument in the institutional context of emerging economies, it is unlikely to hold for companies making large foreign acquisitions in a global environment. The lack of managerial focus and lack of the disciplining force of an external capital market probably leads to a conglomerate discount, and is part of the explanation for why these acquisitions do not create shareholder value.
Historically Indian firms borrowed from nationalized banks whose mandate was to support India's economic development. The Indian firms thus had access to artificially cheap or implicitly subsidized debt capital. 38 It is not surprising that they had high debtequity ratios. 
Conclusion
Emerging economy companies contemplating foreign acquisitions would do well to heed the advice of Malvinder Singh, the former CEO of the pharmaceutical firm Ranbaxy, "It's important for companies to look at the economic rationale, and not get taken to extremes by emotion and ego." 45 resigned from the company and is "ready to move on to other healthcare businesses." As for the billions he earned from the deal, he says "money was not important." 46 Managers however would do well to remember that it is all about money! 
